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onathan Wolff’s Ethics and Public Policy: A Philosophical Inquiry 
offers both an insightful and lucid primer on several 
problems in applied ethics and political philosophy—the 
regulation of drugs and gambling, safety standards, the 
distribution of health-care, the treatment of animals, the proper 
operation of the free market, and so on—as well as the salutary 
reminder that there is more than just philosophical theorizing 
which must be taken into consideration if philosophical 
arguments, and the philosophers who advance them, are going to 
stand any chance of influencing public policy.1 
The division between pure theory and troublesome practice 
actually appears to play a smaller role, however, in Chapter 5, 
where Wolff considers crime and punishment. As ever in moral 
theorizing about punishment, problems as to the effectiveness of 
criminal sentencing are acknowledged, particularly in respect of 
‘forward-looking’ theories of punishment (118-24). Along this 
particular dimension, the main questions Wolff pursues are these. 
How and when does punishment deter? How effectively does it 
deter? What assumptions must we make about the motivational 
profile of those who are likely to be deterred by the prospect of 
punishment, and can these assumptions be squared with what we 
take to be the proportionality conditions on punishment? Perhaps 
theorists of punishment have sometimes been content to 
 
1 Jonathan Wolff, Ethics and Public Policy: A Philosophical Inquiry (London: 
Routledge, 2011). In-text page references will be to this book. 
J 
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speculate about such matters from the armchair, rather than 
through the consultation of empirical data. Be that as it may, the 
significance of empirical questions about the sources of 
motivation and the effectiveness of punishment as a deterrent 
were always staring such theorists in the face. 
Turn now to ‘backward-looking’ theories of punishment, to 
the ranks of which Wolff adds his own theory. (The appraisal of 
this theory will occupy the bulk of my attention in this article.) 
How can such a backward-looking account of punishment avoid 
the charge of being nasty or obnoxious? This is also a wholly 
familiar problem facing backward-looking theorists. 
In sum, the questions about punishment which Wolff raises 
and grapples with are these largely familiar ones. What deserves a 
much closer look is Wolff’s way of tackling those questions. As 
already indicated, I will be dealing mainly with the details of 
Wolff’s backward-looking account.  
This article will unfold as follows. Section I will outline 
Wolff’s backward-looking account of punishment. Some critical 
questions for this account are raised in section II. The remaining 
part of the article will then attempt to show that Wolff is 
nonetheless indirectly getting at something that deserves to be 
taken seriously. In section III, I suggest that the prospects for an 
account broadly sympathetic to Wolff’s aims will be brighter if we 
pay greater attention to the basis of an offender’s liability and the 
connections between self-defence and punishment. Some brief 
conclusions are drawn in section IV. 
 
 
I 
Wolff’s Rebalancing of Status Account 
Wolff offers a striking and ambitious theory of punishment, 
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blending elements of a ‘communicative’ theory (117, 125) and 
retributivism, and I will now quote from it at length.2 It begins to 
be outlined in this passage: 
[W]hat is so bad about crime, or at least some crimes for some people, is 
the fact of being made a victim. It is not so much that others attempt to 
treat you with contempt, but rather that they manage to do so. This is 
why… there is such a psychological difference between failed attempts and 
successful crimes. In succeeding in their crime against you, perhaps, they 
implicitly announce themselves as in some respect your superior. They 
have victimized you, and left you in a lower status. Even when there is no 
identifiable victim—as in the case of vandalism of public property—the 
successful criminal implies that in some sense he or she is above the norm, 
or, at least, above the rules. Crime communicates a message (124-5). 
Wolff continues, in the paragraph below: 
If [that is] so, then punishment appears in a new light. For at least part of 
the purpose of punishment then becomes to re-establish some sort of 
proper status between all the parties. If a criminal is caught and adequately 
punished he has no longer got away with something. He can no longer 
implicitly claim to be of higher status, and those who were victims may feel 
that their victim is expunged, and they have their previous status restored 
to them (125). 
As for crimes without living identifiable victims, either because 
the crimes were so-called ‘victimless’ crimes or because they were 
homicidal: 
The analysis […] still applies in modified form. In the standard case, where 
there is an identifiable surviving victim, punishment ‘rebalances’ status by 
raising the standard of the victim and lowering that of the perpetrator. In 
cases where the victim is dead, nevertheless the punishment can still show 
that we as a society still take that life very seriously… In cases of victimless 
 
2 For a detailed example of a communicative theory, see, in particular, Anthony 
Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001). 
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crime, all that can be done is lower the standing of the perpetrator, but this 
remains a significant matter. The echo of retributivism is, presumably, the 
greater the crime, the more is needed to restore the moral balance. (125) 
As we can see, then, Wolff’s account is focused on the status 
of the offender and the victim: in a criminal act, the offender’s 
status is heightened, and the victim’s status is lowered. 
Punishment then rebalances the offender’s objectionably 
heightened status, and the victim’s objectionably lowered status, 
so that there is, once more, parity of status between them. I will 
call Wolff’s account the Rebalancing of Status Account, or the 
Rebalancing Account for short.  
 
 
II 
Problems with the Rebalancing Account 
By Wolff’s own admission, the Rebalancing Account is 
‘speculative rather than research based’ (127). But that feature 
seems unavoidable in any serious backward-looking account of 
punishment, and is nothing to apologize for, at least as I see it. 
Punishment involves the intentional infliction of suffering, or at 
least hard treatment, on offenders, and that feature raises 
profound moral problems that cannot be settled simply by 
empirical research.3 The basic problem here is that, even in the 
unconstrained speculative space in which philosophers feel most 
at home, there is nothing approaching a secure consensus among 
them as to why it is morally permissible to inflict such hard 
treatment on offenders. So Wolff’s argument for the Rebalancing 
Account will not be taken to task for that reason. That leaves us, 
however, with a few other problems. 
 
3 I take the useful phrase ‘hard treatment’ from T. M. Scanlon, ‘Giving Desert 
Its Due’, Philosophical Explorations 16 (2013): 101-16. 
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In what follows, assume that X is the offender, and that Y is 
the victim. Consider the following claims: 
(1) X criminally offends against Y at t1. 
(2) It is appropriate to punish X, at t2, for his criminal offence 
against Y. 
Claim (1) is true by assumption.4 Claim (2) might strike us, or 
many of us, as intuitively attractive, but we clearly need an 
argument for it. In particular, what is the argument for (2) 
submitted by the Rebalancing Account? 
Our initial task is to get a bit clearer about Wolff’s notion of 
‘status’. The preferred interpretation of Wolffian status must be 
answerable to several different constraints, or features. First, we 
need an interpretation of it which accommodates its alterability: 
status can go up, and it can go down. Call this the alterability 
feature. The alterability feature thus excludes a purely normative 
understanding of status which simply records an individual’s 
worth as a moral agent and moral patient. (Even if (1) is true, Y’s 
worth surely does not decline, and X’s worth surely does not 
increase.) Second, our interpretation of Wolffian status must 
provide for the interconnectedness between the alterations in X’s 
status and Y’s status: because X’s status increases, Y’s status 
declines. Call this the interconnectedness feature. Third, it would be 
pointless to settle for an interpretation of status which simply re-
described (2) in slightly different language. We need claims which 
can genuinely illuminate or explain (2). Call this the explanation 
feature. 
With this slightly fussy stage-setting in mind, we can proceed. 
The following claims form the substance of the Rebalancing 
 
4 Further assume, to ease possible concerns, that the particular offence X 
commits against Y is one which any reasonable or sane jurisdiction would 
criminalize: violent unprovoked assault, for example. 
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Account, and will surely have a large role to play in how the 
Rebalancing Account delivers (2): 
(A) Before t1, X and Y have the same status. 
(B) After t1, as a result of his criminal offence against Y, X has 
a higher status. 
(C) After t1, as a result of her subjection to X’s criminal 
offence against her, Y has a lower status. 
(D) After (proportional) punishment is imposed on X, at t2, 
X’s higher status is lowered to the status X possessed before 
t1. 
(E) After (proportional) punishment is imposed on X, at t2, 
Y’s lower status is raised to the status Y possessed before t1. 
Due to the interconnectedness feature, it makes sense to treat 
these claims primarily in pairs: (B) and (C) need to be jointly 
considered, as well as (D) and (E). We must also pay attention to 
the relationships between these pairs of claims.  
How are (B) and (C) to be interpreted? It makes sense to 
isolate features of (B) and (C) which track, or reflect, the fact that 
X has wronged Y, since that will permit straightforward 
accommodation of the alterability and interconnectedness 
features; it will, furthermore, help us to see how (A) can be true; 
and it will help to pave the way for the explanation feature. But, 
to provide for the explanation feature, we also need to somehow 
go beyond these facts about wrongdoing, since the story about X’s 
wronging of Y does not, by itself, demonstrate why it is 
appropriate, permissible, or desirable to punish X for having 
wronged Y. This is just another way of saying that the truth of (1) 
does not give us any obvious basis for (2). We are appealing to 
the Rebalancing Account, after all, to plug the gap between (1) 
and (2).  
Gerald Lang – Punishment and the Rebalancing of Status 
 59 
Look again at what Wolff says in the passage above: offenders 
‘implicitly announce themselves as in some respect [the victim’s] 
superior’ (125). In victimizing Y, X also implicitly conveys the 
attitude that Y is fit to be victimized, and that X is fit to victimize 
her. But even if this victimization story is true—even if it 
successfully captures X’s underlying attitudes to Y5—it is not 
immediately clear what role it can play in justifying punishment. 
That is, even if the victimization story takes care of (A), (B), and 
(C), it does not obviously take care of (D) and (E). To put the 
underlying point more sharply, we do not need punishment to tell 
us that X’s attitudes are morally flawed. But if we do not appeal 
to our practice of punishing murder and rape to reassure 
ourselves that murder and rape are wrong, then neither should we 
need to appeal to the practice of punishment to reassure 
ourselves that the attitudes which accompanied the original 
offences are morally flawed. Indeed—a stronger point still—it 
would be normatively back-to-front to appeal to the legitimacy of 
punishment to demonstrate that the offences which provoked 
punishment were wrong. So it seems odd to appeal to the practice 
of punishment to demonstrate that the attitudes which 
accompanied those acts were flawed. How could there be such a 
stark justificatory asymmetry at this point in the story? The 
prospects for the explanation feature now seem poor. 
But perhaps Wolff’s deeper point is not that we need to appeal 
to punishment to vindicate the wrongness of the attitudes that 
accompanied the offences, but that punishment gives us an 
appropriate way of publicly expressing our conviction that these 
attitudes were flawed. If these attitudes are morally flawed, then it 
is not inappropriate to seek some form of expression for our 
 
5 Wolff does not pretend to have demonstrated that this account about the 
offender’s attitudes is necessarily manifested in his treatment of the victim 
(125).  
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condemnation. This is an important idea, and I shall be revisiting 
it in the next section. But it is not yet clear how the Rebalancing 
Account establishes that punishment—the imposition of hard 
treatment—is the proper expressive outlet. And it is far from 
clear how punishment can actually rebalance status. Y has been 
victimized, and this is morally objectionable; but how is Y’s status 
as a victim corrected, annulled, or cancelled out by X’s 
punishment? This is a significant lacuna for the Rebalancing 
Account. Wolff’s story about rebalancing status is supposedly 
meant to tell us why punishment is the proper vehicle of that 
rebalancing; but it is none too clear how punishment achieves this 
rebalancing, because it is none too clear what, exactly, is being 
rebalanced. 
We can concede to Wolff that a societal insult would be 
conveyed to Y if we failed to punish X for his offence against 
her, and yet continued to punish other tokens of that offence 
type against other victims. Here it is the selectivity of punishment 
which would indicate that we were taking Y’s victimhood less 
seriously than the victimhood of other individuals. In this 
connection, Wolff gives the example of victims from unpopular 
racial minorities, crimes against whom receive scant investigation 
or publicity (125). But that consideration alone will not serve to 
justify punishment across the board. 
One further comment on the dialectic as it has unfolded so 
far. Some might think that X’s attitudes do not matter as much as 
Y’s attitudes. Y is the victim, and Y may have a very strong 
preference that X be punished for his offence against her. But 
that is not the story offered by Wolff, and for good reason. 
Unless we are committed, on independent grounds, to an 
industrial-strength version of an unrefined preference-satisfaction 
theory, it is implausible to hold that victims’ preferences that 
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offenders be punished can justify punishment. We surely need a 
further account of why those preferences should be heeded.  
Finally, a further problem concerns Wolff’s treatment of the 
difference between attempted crimes and successful crimes. The 
challenge here is that a serious attempt at a criminal offence 
arguably reveals just as much contempt towards the would-be 
victim as a successfully completed crime. True, successful crime 
produces the injury to add to the insult, but Wolff’s Rebalancing 
Account would seem, in any case, to be more concerned with the 
insult than with the injury.  
Wolff happily admits that ‘[c]ontempt is shown even by an 
attempted crime’ (115), but that ‘[a] successful crime cuts deeper’ 
(115). He says: 
In both cases one has been victimized, but there is an important difference. 
In the failed attempt, one may be rather shaken but there may also be a 
rather triumphal feeling ‘I got the better of him!’ When the crime is 
successful, there is no such comfort (115). 
Furthermore: 
[W]hen the attempt is successful perhaps one begins to harbour the 
thought that the contempt is deserved. If I am unable to protect myself, 
what sort of person am I? A successful crime seems, in at least some cases, 
to bring about a change in status and in self-respect (116). 
These passages give expression to a variety of different ideas. 
Now it would be foolish to deny that the injury produced by 
successful attempts, combined with the contempt they express, 
can severely affect a victim’s sense of self-respect and self-worth. 
This is truly a poisonous cocktail for victims to deal with. But 
there is also a hint of strain in the suggestion that victims of 
successful attempts will harbour ‘the thought that the contempt is 
deserved’. If a victim does not deserve to be attacked in the first 
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place, it would be strange to think that the difference between an 
offender’s failed attempt and his successful attempt could 
nonetheless reflect the victim’s desert, and it would be surprising 
if victims standardly came to that distorted view of themselves. 
The difference between failed attempts and successful attempts is 
an important one, as we will see in the next section, but it seems 
to me that Wolff does not quite manage to exploit it in the right 
way. 
So, to sum up. Wolff writes:  
If crime sends a message, then so does punishment, standardly an attempt 
to send a counter-message, cancelling out the first message. (125-6) 
Even if there something attractive about this claim, there are 
at least two major problems for the Rebalancing Account. First, it 
is not clear why a ‘counter-message’ needs to be sent out at all; 
and second, it is not clear how that counter-message can ‘cancel 
out’ the first message issued by the offender. 
 
 
III 
The Extended Liability Account 
I have suggested that there is no obvious interpretation of 
status in the Rebalancing Account that can serve Wolff’s 
purposes. Even if we are strongly persuaded by the claim that it is 
appropriate to punish X for what he did to Y, we lack a 
convincing status-based explanation of that claim: we cannot 
plausibly secure (2) by saying that punishment reduces X’s 
objectionably heightened status and raises objectionably lowered 
Y’s status. We should therefore de-emphasize the notion of status 
in any putative justification of punishment. 
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What should we appeal to instead? The account I propose will 
retain Wolff’s investment in the story about the communicative 
significance of punishment, but jettison his investment in the 
story about rebalancing status. However, we need to start yet 
further back. I propose that we start with an account that blends 
backward-looking and forward-looking considerations: namely, 
an account which seeks ultimate grounding for the permissibility 
of punishment in the permissibility of self-defence.6 More 
specifically, I suggest that we begin with X’s liability to self-
defensive action. Now there are many ways of grounding 
defensive permissions and attacker’s liability. I will not be 
concerned here with these intramural debates among self-defence 
theorists; my aim is simply to argue that, however the attacker’s 
liability is to be grounded, it is implausible to hold that his liability 
evaporates altogether when his offence is completed. 
Imagine, in some very nearby possible world to the world that 
was described by (1) and (2), that X is in the course of criminally 
offending against Y. (To be more specific, imagine that X is 
about to assault Y.) On the basis of X’s attack on Y, we seem able 
to say the following: 
(3) Y is permitted to take necessary and proportionate violent 
self-defensive action against X. 
And, as an extension of (3), we can also say: 
 
66 See, for example, Warren Quinn, ‘The Right to Threaten and the Right to 
Punish’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 14 (1985): 327-73, and Daniel Farrell, ‘The 
Justification of Deterrent Violence’, Ethics 100 (1990): 301-17. David Boonin, 
The Problem of Punishment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 192-
211, provides a detailed critique of this ‘self-defence solution’ to punishment. I 
lack the room here to engage with the full details of Boonin’s critique; I can 
only set the ball rolling in the right direction, by arguing that X’s liability to 
defensive attack establishes a presumption that X is also liable to punishment.  
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(4) Z (a third party) is permitted to take necessary and 
proportionate other-defensive action on behalf of Y against X. 
And, as a way of explaining how these permissions arise, we can 
say: 
(5) In virtue of his attack on Y, X is liable to be attacked in 
self-defence (by Y) or in other-defence (by Z), subject to the 
necessity and proportionality conditions on self-defence and 
other-defence. 
Of course, the world that was described by (1) and (2)—the 
‘punishment world’—is not the ‘defensive world’ jointly 
characterized by (3), (4) and (5). In the punishment world, the 
imminent threat to Y has been and gone. It is therefore too late 
to apply self-defensive or other-defensive violent action to avert 
X’s attack on Y.7 The point is, by now, a fairly familiar one in the 
literature, but it bears blunt restatement: 
When Moe harms Larry in self-defense, he harms Larry in order to prevent 
Larry from wrongfully harming him. But when the state punishes an 
offender, it punishes him precisely because he has already succeeded in 
wrongfully harming someone. It is easy to see how the notion of self-
defense can justify harm to prevent a particular wrong from taking place. 
But it is far more difficult to see how an appeal to self-defense could be 
used to justify inflicting harm in response to a particular wrong when it is 
already too late to prevent that wrong from taking place and thus too late 
to provide a defense against it.8  
Can the moral content of (5) nonetheless cast useful light on 
the permissibility of punishment? I believe it can.  
Imagine that X’s attack on Y begins at t0, and is successfully 
completed at t1, as (1) stipulates. Between t0 and t1, X is liable to 
 
7 To save words from now on, the phrase ‘self-defensive or other-defensive’ 
will be compressed into, simply, ‘defensive’. 
8 Boonin, The Problem of Punishment, 193-4; original emphases. 
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defensive attack. From t1 onwards, X can be no longer be liable 
to defensive attack, for the simple reason that the conditions 
applying to defensive attack no longer obtain. But it is intuitively 
odd to think that X’s moral standing is no longer impaired, just 
because X has now succeeded in an attempt which he was 
morally forbidden from making in the first place.9 Plausibly, X’s 
overall moral standing is even worse after t1, since the successful 
completion of his criminal attempt to F is morally worse than his 
mere attempt to F. That is: 
(6) X’s successfully completed offence against Y is a morally 
worse action than X’s mere attempt to commit an offence 
against Y. 
But what should we conclude from (6)? Even if it is true of X, 
after t1, that X was liable to defensive violence between t0 and t1, 
what further relevance does that fact have? On one view, that fact 
has no further relevance: X’s liability to hard treatment is 
exhausted by his liability to defensive attack, which obtains only 
in the interval between t0 and t1. After t1, in the world in which 
X’s attempt is successfully completed, X is simply not liable to 
hard treatment. Call this the No Further Implications View. 
The No Further Implications View strikes me as intuitively 
implausible. But it will not do, in this context, to rest the 
argument squarely on confidence in that verdict. Friends of the 
No Further Implications View may reply that, even though X is 
not liable to any hard treatment upon expiry of the conditions for 
defensive attack, X’s moral standing is still impaired, simply because 
 
9 See Gerald Lang, “Why Not Forfeiture?,” in How We Fight: Ethics in War 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), ed. H. Frowe and G. Lang, at 43. My 
particular concern, in that discussion, was with the prospects for a forfeiture 
account of self-defence; now I am trying, on the assumption that there is some 
or other secure basis for the liability of an individual to defensive attack, to 
enlarge the basic story to encompass the individual’s liability to punishment.   
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(6) is true. If (6) is true, then X can still be blamed for what he did, 
even if he cannot, on that basis, be punished for what he did. 
I am not persuaded by this counter-response, for reasons that 
are partly connected with something that is laboured by Wolff: 
the communicative significance of punishment, or (to put it more 
neutrally) the communicative significance of having some effective 
form of social condemnation of criminal wrongdoing. On the No 
Further Implications View, X can be blamed, but not punished. 
However ‘hot’ blame can be—however ardently or forcefully it 
can be conveyed—it cannot take the same form as the hard 
treatment (in this case, defensive violence) that would be 
appropriate had X not successfully completed his attempt to 
wrong Y. But then it will seem that, by comparison with the 
sanctions available for dealing with the normative situation 
between t0 and t1, X is actually being rewarded for the successful 
completion of his criminal attempt against Y. If this ‘sends out a 
message’, then the message it sends out is that X’s position is 
improved if he does something that is morally worse. 
To recapitulate, there are at least three problems to worry 
about if the No Further Implications View is taken to be true. 
First, public condemnation of X’s offence will be largely drained 
of force, conviction, or efficacy. The condemnation will seem 
relatively toothless. Second, the relative toothlessness of the 
public condemnation of X’s offence may contribute to, and help 
to sustain, Y’s feelings of psychological and social fragility. Third, 
this feature also seems apt to generate a perverse personal 
incentive for X to do something that is morally worse. 
To escape these implications, I propose that we embrace the 
following: 
(7) The facts which make X liable to defensive attack between 
t0 and t1 also make X liable to punishment after t1. 
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We can refer to the account I have sketched, in admittedly 
embryonic form, as the Extended Liability Account. The Extended 
Liability Account plainly differs from the Rebalancing Account. 
But, as I have already hinted, I think there may be underlying 
similarities between them. I try to identify what they are in the 
concluding section. 
 
 
IV 
Conclusion: Rebalancing the Rebalancing Account 
I have argued that Wolff’s Rebalancing Account fails to deliver 
what he is after: namely, a secure backward-looking account of 
punishment. My view is that, if an offender is liable to the hard 
treatment constituted by defensive force, then he is also liable to 
the hard treatment constituted by punishment. As I see it, 
punishment does not rebalance the respective statuses of the 
offender and the victim. That is an essential element of Wolff’s 
story, and it is no real part of mine. 
However, the Extended Liability Account also leans, at certain 
points, on similar intuitions as Wolff’s about the communicative 
or expressive significance of punishment; and it aims to respect 
and uphold the victim’s status by helping to confirm that the 
offender’s completed offence leaves him in a worse moral and 
personal position than he was in when he had not yet completed 
that offence. As different in crucial aspects as they may be, then, 
the Rebalancing Account and the Extended Liability Account still 
draw water from the same well.10 
 
University of Leeds 
 
10 I thank Corine Besson, Jimmy Lenman, and Fiona Woollard for helpful 
conversations about these issues. 
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